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My main goal in this paper is to argue that the concept of rationality is central in Grice’s phi-
losophy. Grice does not affirm this explicitly, but on several occasions throughout his work 
he indicates that rationality is a key concept, which enables both conversational practice 
and the development of philosophical theses. In order to show the importance of rationality 
to Grice, I will analyze his work according to three aspects: (i) logical and teleological; (ii) 
ethical and metaethical; and (iii) linguistic and pragmatic. In my view, in all three rationality is 
fundamental. Actually, a proper characterization of some of his philosophical discussions is 
only possible through this concept. Furthermore, I intend to show the relationships between 
rationality and other basic concepts in Grice. 
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RESUMO
Meu objetivo principal neste artigo é argumentar que o conceito de racionalidade é central 
na filosofia de Grice. Grice não afirma isto explicitamente, mas, em várias ocasiões ao lon-
go de sua obra, ele indica que racionalidade é um conceito chave, o qual possibilita tanto 
a prática conversacional, quanto o desenvolvimento de teses filosóficas. Com o intuito de 
mostrar a importância da racionalidade para Grice, irei analisar sua obra em três aspectos: 
(i) lógico e teleológico; (ii) ético e metaético; e (iii) linguístico e pragmático. Em meu ponto 
de vista, em todos os aspectos racionalidade é fundamental. Na verdade, uma adequada 
caracterização de algumas de suas discussões filosóficas somente é possível através desse 
conceito. Além disso, pretendo mostrar as relações mantidas entre racionalidade e outros 
conceitos básicos em Grice.
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Introduction
Herbert Paul Grice is best known in the history of philosophy for his classical works on 
philosophy of language and philosophical pragmatics. Throughout his work he focuses on hu-
man linguistic behaviors and the mental processes underlying them. The analysis of linguistic 
behavior shows, for example, that people are rational creatures and that rationality is fundamen-
tal for the communicative process of transference and understanding of meanings. Most of his 
philosophical contributions, e ecially his theory of conversational implicatures, played a central 
role in discussions on semantics and pragmatics for a long time. The reflections on the relations 
between the linguistic meaning of certain expressions and the meaning that such expressions 
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acquire in some contexts involving  eakers and hearers are 
a crucial landmark in the development of the philosophy of 
ordinary language. Grice’s approach aims at, among other 
things, showing the apparent discrepancies between classical 
logic and natural language. Papers like Meaning (1957), Logic 
and Conversation (1975) and others are mandatory readings 
to anyone focusing on linguistic meaning.  
In the late 1970s, Grice applied his linguistic reflec-
tions to wider philosophical fields, in particular to discus-
sions associated with ethics (metaethics) and metaphysics. 
These new philosophical interests yielded two books, post-
humously published, namely A ects of Reason (2001) and 
The Conception of Value (1991). The former contains a de-
tailed and interesting analysis of the philosophical concep-
tion of rationality. Grice’s main goal is to clarify and deter-
mine the nature of the concept of reason and to draw its 
philosophical implications. His analysis is basically logical 
and linguistic, and based on earlier reflections on language. 
In the second book, Grice presents a metaphysics of value 
and argues that rationality is the attribute which defines 
what he calls “person”. Human beings, because they are ra-
tional, are not mere biological creatures, but belong to a dif-
ferent kind of metaphysical entity called “person”. The basic 
difference between “person” and “biological creature” is that 
the latter have rationality as an accidental property, where-
as “persons” are essentially rational. Rationality, therefore, is 
the essential chara eristic of “person”. Furthermore, ratio-
nality renders possible the construction of moral values.
This philosophical conception of rationality plays a 
fundamental role in Grice’s posthumous writings. How-
ever, I intend to argue in this paper that the same is true, 
although implicitly, of his previous work on philosophy of 
language and linguistics. Rationality, in my view, is of fun-
damental importance also in Grice’s work on linguistic 
pra ice. Conversation is essentially a cooperative a ivity 
in which it is necessary that the  eakers follow basic rules 
that enable meanings to be transferred. My central thesis 
is, therefore, that the conception of reason, or rationality, 
is the most important concept in Grice’s work. I will divide 
my paper in three sections: in (i) I present the conception 
of rationality in A ects of Reason; in (ii) I reconstruct the 
distinction between biological beings and “persons” and the 
importance of rationality for the construction of values; 
and in (iii) I show that rationality is also a basic concept in 
Grice’s claims about language.
Part I – Aspects of Reason and 
rationality in logic and language
In searching for a systematic analysis of the Gricean con-
ception of rationality, probably the most appropriate thing is 
to start by A ects of Reason (2001). Although this is not the 
chronological order of Grice’s work, in A ects of Reason the 
conception of rationality is presented in a very clear way and, 
certainly, it is the core of his thesis on the subject. 
In the late 1970s, Grice gave a series of lectures in Stan-
ford and Oxford in the so-called John Locke Lectures. The re-
sults of these lectures were eventually expanded and modified 
by Grice himself until his death in 1988, and, in 2001, Richard 
Warner published an edition of these lectures entitled A ects 
of Reason. Grice, in this book, aims to determine what the 
idea of a rational being is, as well as the philosophical conse-
quences that can be achieved by the exercise of rationality2. 
The conception of rationality is defined as the capacity and 
interest that the attitudes, decisions, beliefs, etc. of one who 
has such property are well grounded or validated and that 
consequences can be drawn from the reasoning involved in 
the rational process. Rationality, as Grice says, is a minimal 
competence present in reasoning. The concept of reasoning, 
in turn, is determined in terms of the notions of inference and 
preservation of value. 
The chara erization of the concept of reasoning is es-
sential to clarify the relations between theoretical (or alethic, 
as Grice prefers) and pra ical reason. Grice defends the idea 
that, ultimately, we do not have two reasons operating inde-
pendently, but that alethic and pra ical reason are a ects 
of a single notion of reason3. Rationality operates both in the 
cognitive and in the pra ical sphere (see Reply to Richards, 
Grice, 1986, p. 72). The later analysis performed by Grice on 
the indicative and imperative sentences, the formalizations of 
these sentences, and subsequently the analysis of mixed infer-
ences necessarily required the concept of rationality.
In the two first chapters of A ects of Reason, Grice does 
what seems to be a topography (or mapping) of reasons and 
tries, among other things, to explain the relations between 
alethic and pra ical reason. In order to elucidate his philo-
sophical program about the subject, Grice seeks: (1) to de-
termine the concept of reasoning; (2) to identify examples 
of problematic reasoning; (3) to distinguish flat rationality 
from variable rationality; (4) to present the different kinds 
2 In the philosophical tradition, we can find two proposals very similar to this, namely, the Aristotelian and the Kantian ones. They also 
tried, based on the clarification of the nature of reason, to make the passage from the idea of a rational being to its philosophical con-
sequences. To Aristotle reason is the essential characteristic of a human being, allowing one to distinguish it from the other creatures. 
Reason is associated to men’s end, to the contemplative activity, to the exercise of contemplation of metaphysical truths. According 
to Grice, in Aristotle we have theoretical rationality as central. On the other hand, in Kant, although there is the thesis defending the 
existence of a single faculty of reason, we have the moral necessity of adherence or acceptance of the categorical imperative. In the 
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, Kant (2010, p. 175, 2011, p. 194) argues that, linked up with speculative reason, practical reason has 
the primacy.
3 Grice holds a similar position to the Kantian one. Rational being has a single faculty of reason which may have a theoretical and a 
practical use. However, differently from Kant, Grice does not defend the idea that there is a primacy of one of them over the other.
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of reason (explanatory, justificatory and personal reason); 
and (5) to investigate if in the ordinary sense ‘reason’ has 
the same or a different sense in ‘alethic reason’ and ‘pra ical 
reason’. Consequently, “he considers different ways in which 
the word ‘reason’ is used, classifies these uses into different 
categories, and illustrates these categories with examples” 
(Chapman, 2005, p. 145). 
Grice, unsatisfied with the previous approaches about 
the nature of reason (Aristotle and Kant, in particular), takes 
as his starting point the idea that reason must be understood 
as the faculty manife ed in the construction of reasoning. 
After the investigation of what is understood by reasoning it 
would be possible to draw philosophical conclusions from the 
conception of reason. Reasoning is defined by Grice, at first, 
as follows: 
[...] reasoning consists in the entertain-
ment (and often acceptance) in thought or 
in speech of a set of initial ideas (proposi-
tions), together with a sequence of ideas 
each of which is derivable by an acceptable 
principle of inference from its predecessors 
in the set (2001, p. 5).
Later, he expands this notion by the introduction of 
the will:
The burden of the foregoing observations 
seems to me to be that the provisional ac-
count of reasoning, which has been before 
us, leaves out something which is crucially 
important. What it leaves out is the concep-
tion of reasoning as an activity, as some-
thing with goals and purposes; it leaves out, 
in short, the connection of reasoning with 
the will (2001, p. 16).
These two passages deserve  ecial attention: in the first, 
Grice, despite using a classical conception of logical inference, 
defines neither what precisely the notion of inference is nor 
what the nature of these supposed initial ideas or propositions 
is. However, taking into account his subsequent reflections, it 
seems clear that Grice defends the idea that reasoning must 
be understood as a process where, in general, we are interest-
ed in deriving sentences from a particular type, which must 
preserve some sort of value. Reasoning should be considered 
as a faculty of extension of our acceptances by valid forms 
of transition from a set of initial acceptabilities to new ac-
ceptabilities: in this process there must be transmission of 
value from the premises to the conclusion. “By ‘value’ I mean 
some property which is of value (of a certain kind of value, no 
doubt). Truth is one such property, but it may not be the only 
one; and we now reached a point at which we can identify an-
other, namely, pra ical value (goodness)” (Grice, 2001, p. 87). 
This means that if the propositions that are components of 
the inferences have ‘truth’ as their value, then the proposition 
derived from them, by the principles of inference, should also 
has ‘truth’ as its value. Similarly, if we are using propositions 
that are not theoretical, but pra ical, and the value is ‘good-
ness’ and not ‘truth’, then all that is derived from them should 
preserve ‘goodness’. “We have sentence-radicals which qualify 
for ‘radical truth’ or ‘radical falsity’; some of those which so 
qualify, also qualify for ‘radical goodness’ or ‘radical badness” 
(Grice, 2001, p. 88).  
The second passage quoted above indicates a commit-
ment to pragmatic a ects. Reasoning, affirms Grice, is an 
a ivity and, as an a ivity, it must be directed to goals and 
purposes. There is an element of will associated with this 
chara erization of reasoning and it is the will that leads hu-
man reasoning to achieve these goals and purposes. This posi-
tion seems right, since it would be unusual to build reasoning 
and inferences entirely devoid of purposes4. When we think 
reflexively, generally, we want to solve problems, and “reason-
ing is chara eristically addressed to problems: small problems, 
large problems, problems within problems, clear problems, 
hazy problems, pra ical problems, intellectual problems; but 
problems” (Grice, 2001, p. 16). 
Reason, in short, is the faculty that appears in the pro-
duction of reasoning. Nevertheless, the issue is not so sim-
ple. Grice assumes that for the proper chara erization of 
the nature of reason it is necessary to investigate other el-
ements associated with reasoning, like the different kinds 
of rationality, reasons and so on. Based on that, he makes 
a number of important distinctions to clarify the point. 
He distinguishes, first, flat rationality from variable ratio-
nality, then the three different kinds of reasons: explanatory 
reasons, justificatory reasons and justificatory-explanatory 
reasons (or personal reasons). It is only possible to think 
about the relation between alethic and pra ical rationality 
after making these distinctions.
The first distinction proposed by Grice is between flat 
and variable rationality (cf. Grice, 2001, p. 20-21, 28-36). 
This distinction is based on the idea that we can understand 
the structure of rationality in two different ways: on the one 
4 Susan Stebbing, a famous logician from the early twentieth century, proposes a similar idea. According to Stebbing (1930, 1939), in 
ordinary speech we are often engaged in a process directed to some practical end. Thinking logically is to think in a relevant way for 
the initial purpose of thinking. Actually, every reflexive thinking is directed to an end. The process of reflexive thinking is known as 
inferring. “Thinking [we can say reasoning] involves asking questions and trying to find answers to these questions” (Stebbing, 1939, 
p. 27). Therefore, reflexive thinking has a natural end, the conclusion of the reflection. Reflective thinking consists in pondering upon a 
set of facts so as to elicit their connections. The various stages in this process are related to the conclusion as the grounds upon which 
it is based. Stebbing (1930, p. 9) calls these grounds ‘premises’. Furthermore, exactly like Grice, Stebbing says that reflexive thinking 
emerges from a problem to be solved and is throughout controlled by the conditions of the problem and directed to its solution. For 
more details about Stebbing, see Chapman (2013).
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hand, rationality is a flat (non-variable) capacity, that allows 
us to apply inferential rules; and, on the other hand, rational-
ity is a variable (degree-bearing) capacity, in which interpre-
tation is an excellence or competence, and is differentiated 
into a variety of subordinate excellences or competences (see 
Grice, 2001, p. 27). 
In variable rationality we have a conception of rationali-
ty in which the structure of reason is fragmented, variable. In 
this sense, there is not a fundamental rationality from which 
other types of rationality are derived. Variable rationality is a 
set of different kinds of rationality operating at the same level. 
These different rationalities can be considered as excellences. 
Differently, in non-variable rationality, or flat rationality, dif-
ferences of degree are not admissible. According to Grice, flat 
rationality is a basic conception of rationality, it is ultimate 
and not defined in terms of variable rationality. Thus, flat ra-
tionality is central with re ect to a type of creature called Ra-
tional Being (in the Aristotelian sense), underlying any other 
kinds of reason.
These two capacities, however, are connected. The 
problematic point, nevertheless, is how to determine which 
kind of rationality really is the most fundamental one. Prima 
facie, we are led to accept a first pattern, in which flat ratio-
nality is basic and variable rationality is merely an unfolding, 
an increase of excellences. Variable rationality, in this sense, 
is obtained by derivation, according to appropriate inference 
methods, from flat rationality. This first pattern chara er-
izes a  ecification of minimal skills of the rational being. 
A proposed analogy to exemplify the first pattern involves 
chess-playing. Flat rationality can be thought as the rules 
that allow someone to play chess, to know the position and 
the movement of the pieces. Variable rationality, in turn, is 
thought as being able to play chess well. The knowledge of the 
rules of the game is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition 
to be a good chess player and win chess games. Consequent-
ly, variable rationality could be thought as being additional to 
this essential notion of rationality.
However, in contrast with this first pattern, Grice pres-
ents another pattern in which variable rationality is primary 
in relation to flat rationality. In this pattern, flat rationality 
has its origin in variable rationality through a limitation of it. 
The second pattern does not require a minimal competence 
in every rational being, something which is required by the 
first pattern.
Analyzing the two patterns, Grice concludes that both 
are problematic. The first one, for example, has difficulties to 
 ecify what the minimal competences of the rational being 
are and, mainly, how to derive variable rationality from flat 
rationality. On the other hand, the second pattern is unable 
to determine the borders of variable rationality, i.e., is un-
able to stipulate a minimal degree of rationality. Because of 
these problems, Grice (2001, p. 34) rejects both patterns and 
presents a third pattern seeking to give a reasonable answer 
to the question about the structure of reason. The third pat-
tern takes into account chara eristics of the other two, but 
assumes basically that rationality consists in an attempt, a de-
mand, to be rational. In this pattern there is a parallel between 
the two previous patterns. Someone is rational if, on the one 
hand, he exhibits some degree of rationality and, on the oth-
er hand, if he exhibits what Grice calls proto-rationality. The 
two parallel patterns, in the third pattern, are the following:
Pattern A 
X exhibits rationality iff x exhibits some de-
gree of [variable] rationality.
No minimum (determinate) degree of ra-
tionality.
Pattern B 
X exhibits rationality iff x exhibits proto-ra-
tionality.
There may be degrees of proto-rationality, 
but to be rational x does not have to exhib-
it any of these; he might fall off the scale 
of proto-rationality but fall within (non-vari-
able rationality), since he is seeking to fall 
on the scale of proto-rationality. [One who 
has no proto-rationality may still be ratio-
nal, since rationality is a matter of seeking 
proto-rationality].
This proto-rationality can be thought simply as a ten-
dency to be rational. In Reply to Richards (1986, p. 83-84), Grice 
explicitly affirms that one of the main features of reason is to 
operate in pre-rational states. An example of this is when we 
produce synta ic-semantic satisfactory utterances according 
to the grammatical rules of a language without the aid of a der-
ivation in some synta ic-semantic theory. It is not necessary 
to exhibit degrees of rationality to be rational. The ability to 
produce transitions from an initial group of propositions to a 
new proposition through an inference rule does not require 
that such rationalization be present in a conscious way. “[...] it 
requires at most that our propensity to produce such transi-
tions be dependent in some way upon our acquisition or pos-
session of a capacity to reason explicitly” (Grice, 1986, p. 84).
After distinguishing between flat and variable rationali-
ty, Grice (2001, p. 37-43) performs another fundamental dis-
tinction to clarify the relations between alethic and pra ical 
reason, namely, the distinction between three kinds of rea-
sons (explanatory, justificatory and personal reasons)5. 
Pure explanatory reasons can be explained by their fac-
tivity. We clearly see that in a sentence like “The fact that 
5 In Baker (2010, p. 185) we read: “In this work [Aspects of Reason] he [Grice] reaffirmed one of his central positions, that reason is 
univocal, that there is a common structure of theoretical and practical reasons. He also clearly distinguishes the two important features 
of reasons for action, that reasons explain and that they justify. Grice proposed three classes of both practical and theoretical reasons: 
a purely explanatory, a purely justificatory, and a hybrid of the two”.
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the girders were made of cellophane was the reason why the 
bridge collapsed” there is a causal relation between two facts, 
‘the girders made of cellophane’ and ‘the bridged collapsed’. 
Reason, in this case, is a cause. The paradigmatic form of ex-
planatory reasons is “That B is (was) a (the) reason why A 
(The reason why A was that B)”. Therefore, B is a causal ex-
planation of A: both A and B are facts.
Justificatory reasons, in turn, are reasons ‘for’ or reasons 
‘to’. This kind of reason may conceal a psychological verb like 
‘think’, ‘want’, ‘decide’ or may  ecify an a ion. Justificatory 
reasons, consequently, do not exclude person-relativization. 
The paradigmatic form is “That B is (was) (a) reason (for X) 
to A”. An example provided by Grice (2001, p. 38) is “The fact 
that they were a day late was some (a) reason for thinking 
that the bridge had collapsed”. In this case, B is a justification 
to think, do, or want A, and A is non-fa ive.
Justificatory-explanatory reasons (or personal reasons) 
are the third kind of reasons. The main difference with re ect 
to the other two kinds of reason is that personal reasons de-
mand a total person-relativization. In this case, there is fa icity 
for A and fa icity or non-fa icity for B. Personal reasons con-
tains features of the other kinds of reasons and have, therefore, 
a hybrid nature. They are  ecial cases of explanatory reasons, 
because they do explain, but what they explain are a ions and 
certain psychological attitudes. The canonical form is “The rea-
son(s) for A-ing was (were) that B (to B)”. An example is “John’s 
reason for thinking Samantha to be a witch was that he had 
suddenly turned into a frog” (cf. Grice, 2001, p. 40). 
Justificatory reasons, concludes Grice, are the most im-
portant ones, because they are contained both in explanatory 
and in personal reasons. They lie at the heart of other variet-
ies of reason (cf. Grice, 2001, p. 67). Although, in Grice’s view, 
we have different kinds of reasons, they are not disconnected, 
because justification is always present. Explanatory reasons 
justify facts; justificatory reasons justify facts by psychological 
states; and personal reasons justify the agents to think that 
something is the case and to act in some way (personal rea-
sons are final causes). Moreover, justificatory reasons are the 
essential pieces from which good arguments are constituted.
But the point that makes justificatory reasons really  e-
cial is the fact that they are divisible into alethic and pra i-
cal reasons. If we suppose that there is a barrier separating 
the alethic from the pra ical field, we will easily see that on 
both sides of this barrier certain words, called by Grice com-
mon modals, such ‘must’, ‘ought’, ‘should’, ‘necessary’, etc. appear 
constantly in the  ecification of justificatory reasons. These 
words are connected with a justificatory feature and they can 
be found in alethic and pra ical inferences. Grice’s idea (2001, 
p. 69) is that an analysis of justificatory reasons leads naturally 
to an analysis of modals, which express  ecific types of justifi-
cation, and to mode-makers, which are intimately connected 
with psychological attitudes needing justification. From this 
per ective Grice approaches the relation between alethic 
and pra ical reason and the examination and formalization 
of alethic and pra ical sentences.
In the pursuit of a common framework for alethic and 
pra ical sentences, Grice breaks down the sentences, for-
malizes them and introduces some operators: a rationality 
operator, a mood operator and a radical. He introduces, con-
sequently, mood operators to alethic and pra ical sentences 
and a common rationality operator. The mood operators are 
formalized as ‘ ’ and ‘!’. The former corresponds to alethic 
sentences and the latter to pra ical sentences. The common 
rationality operator is formalized as ‘Acc’ and can be translat-
ed to natural language as ‘it is acceptable that’, ‘it is reasonable 
that’, etc.
In alethic sentences we have Acc +  + r, where the 
symbol ‘ ’ indicates that the content of the radical r is being 
judged, while in pra ical sentences we have Acc + ! + r, where 
the symbol ‘!’ indicates that the content r is an imperative, a 
command. Furthermore, every symbol is subordinate to its 
predecessor in the series. We can see the distinctions in the 
following example: 
(1) Peter must be studying now.              (A)
(2) Peter, you must study now!                (B)
The verb ‘must’ appears in the two sentences. In the first 
sentence, the verb has an alethic sense, while in the second it 
has a pra ical sense. ‘Must,’ in (1), indicates a state of affairs, 
the state of affairs that Peter must be studying now. In (2), 
‘must’ indicates that the sentence is an imperative, an order 
that Peter should perform. It is possible to rewrite the two 
sentences in Grice’s terminology as follows:
(1’) Acc +  + r          (A)
(2’) Acc + ! + r               (B)
The sentences (1’) e (2’) replace (1) and (2). Grice in-
troduces the rationality operator, then the mood operator, 
and lastly the content of the sentence, the radical. In the third 
chapter of A ects of Reason, Grice (2001, p. 73) defines the 
judicative operator, ‘ ’, as ‘it is the case that’ and the volitive 
operator, ‘!’, as ‘let it be’. Now we have:
(1’’) It is acceptable that it is the case that A
(2’’) It is acceptable that let it be that B
The symbol that Grice uses to indicate the judicative 
operator is the same symbol used by Frege in his Begriffsschrift, 
in logic symbolism. The symbol that indicates the volitive 
operator is a simple exclamation mark. Finally, the radical ‘r’ 
is essentially the content of the sentence. Grice (2001, p. 50) 
assumes that there are similarities between his approach and 
Hare’s approach in The Language of Morals (1952), when Hare 
distinguishes phra ic from neustic. Grice (2001, p. 50) says:
An initial version of the idea I want to ex-
plore is that we represent the sentences (1) 
“John should be recovering his health by 
now” and (2) “John should join AA” as hav-
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ing the following structure: first, a common 
“rationality” operator ‘Acc’, to be heard 
as “it is reasonable that”, “it is acceptable 
that”, “it ought to be that”, “it should be 
that”, or in some other similar way; next, 
one or other of two mood-operators, which 
in the case of (1) are to be written as ‘ ’ 
and in the case of (2) are to be written as 
‘!’; and finally a ‘radical’, to be represented 
by ‘r’ or some other lower-case letter. The 
structure for (1) is Acc +  + r, for (2) Acc 
+ ! + r, with each symbol falling within the 
scope of its predecessor. I am thinking of a 
radical in pretty much the same kind of way 
as recent writers who have used that term 
(or the term ‘phrastic’). 
However, given that Grice is a philosopher worried 
about how we use language in ordinary life, his approach is 
not restricted only to a purely formal analysis. The mood 
operators used until this moment are not enough to express 
everyday language. Thinking in this way, he introduces new 
modal operators and some elements from his linguistic/
pragmatics theory. The first habitat, says Grice (2001, p. 51), 
where mood differences have their origin is in  eech. In or-
der not to extend the discussion, I will not treat these points, 
but it is important to note that after formalizing how mood 
differences occur in  eech and thought, Grice builds differ-
ent kinds of theoretical and pra ical acceptabilities (includ-
ing prudential acceptabilities, which, in the last two chapters 
of A ects of Reason, give rise to an elegant approach to the 
philosophical conception of eudaimonia). These acceptabili-
ties are the way in which rationality operates in the construc-
tion of reasoning. Every time that we build alethic or pra ical 
arguments we use the acceptability operator. In this sense, in a 
logical and linguistic context, the concept of rationality is ex-
tremely important to Grice. An approach to eudaimonia and 
ends is only possible if we can clarify adequately the concept 
of reason and its cognates. 
Part II – Rationality and value
Section I shows that A ects of Reason is the core of the 
Gricean conception of rationality. In a very clear way, Grice 
makes a series of important distinctions trying to clarify what 
is the philosophical conception of reason and what conse-
quences we can derive from it. Now, in this section, my main 
goal is to reconstruct some central ideas on ethics and meta-
physics of morals, basically in The Conception of Value (1991). 
If in A ects of Reason Grice examines the logical features of 
reasoning, in The Conception of Value he proposes a meta-
physical treatment of rationality and values. Rationality is 
conceived as an essential property of the metaphysical entity 
called ‘person’. In this sense, in this second book, also posthu-
mously published and resulting from Grice’s Carus Lectures 
in 1983, there is a philosophical application of the logical 
chara erization of reason in a metaphysical context. Grice 
explains why rationality is a central feature of persons and 
that, through it, rational beings are able to construct values 
and to reach the ends of human life6. 
As Grice himself says in The Conception of Value (1991, 
p. 91), the Carus Lectures contain many ideas that are ob-
scure, fragmentary and ill defended. However, with some ef-
fort, it is possible to systematize some of these obscure ideas, 
e ecially for my purposes, the relations between rationality 
and value. The Carus Lectures are divided into three lectures: 
the first and the second lectures concern the objectivity of 
values, while the third one focuses on the relation between 
metaphysics and value. I want to explain the discussion found 
in the third lecture, because this is where Grice presents the 
distinction between biological beings and persons and intro-
duces the notions of “Metaphysical Transubstantiation” and 
of “Humean Projection”, which are essential to understand the 
Gricean constructivist program in Metaphysics of Morals. 
The study of ethics has for long been concerned with the 
analysis of value judgments (cf. Chapman, 2005, p. 158). To 
understand the meaning of moral sentences it is fundamental 
to explain what moral concepts are. In this per ective, it is 
possible to identify at least two different approaches to the 
problem of moral concepts: an objectivist and a non-objectiv-
ist (or subjectivist) approach. The first maintains that moral 
concepts, like ‘good’, ‘wrong’, etc., have an ontological existence 
that is independent of human beings. On the other hand, a 
non-objectivist approach maintains that moral concepts ex-
ist, but that they are constituted by human mental a ivity. 
Consequently, the question about the objectivity of values is 
not a mere linguistic question, but an ontological one. 
Grice’s starting point in the discussions on ethics is an 
attack on the non-objectivist conceptions of value, e ecial-
ly J.L. Mackie (1977) and Philippa Foot (1972). In Inventing 
Right and Wrong, Mackie (1977, p. 15), for instance, holds the 
thesis that “there are no objective values”. To defend this the-
sis, known as ‘error theory’, Mackie uses two main arguments: 
(i) the argument from relativity, and (ii) the argument from 
queerness. The first argument focuses on the different cultur-
al moral codes: the idea is that different cultures have different 
moral codes. According to Mackie, by empirical observations 
we can see that there are great variations in cultural codes 
for the conduct of life and that moral disagreements are fre-
quently chara erized by an unusual degree of unsociability. 
However, the problem is very simple: if there is a realm of 
6 Grice explicitly assumes a teleological (Aristotelian) position both in the posthumous books (Aspects of Reason and The Conception of 
Value) and in the linguistic papers. In our ordinary life, as moral agents, we are looking for a finality to our lives; likewise, in our linguistic 
practice, we use language to some purposes, especially to transfer information. Consequently, all our activities, conscious or not, are 
addressed to specific ends.
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objective values, why can one culture (or more) access these 
objective values and other cultures cannot? A possible exam-
ple is monogamy: in some cultures, monogamy is regarded as 
a correct pra ice, that people have to perform, but in others 
it is regarded as a wrong pra ice or a pra ice of little worth. 
“This diversity, Mackie suggests, argues that moral values re-
flect ways of life within particular societies, rather than draw-
ing on perceptions of moral absolute values external to these 
societies” (Chapman, 2005, p. 160). The second argument, 
the argument from queerness, claims that our moral proper-
ties are of a very strange sort, different from anything else in 
the universe. Furthermore, in order to identify these strange 
properties we would need some  ecial faculty of moral per-
ception completely different from our ordinary ways to know 
or to access something. We don’t have perception of moral 
values in the same way that we have perception of a color, 
like the blue in a shirt. Therefore, to Mackie, in objectivist 
accounts of value, there would be an odd relation between 
non-natural and natural properties. 
There are at least three different rea ions to Mackie’s 
error theory (cf. Grice, 1991, p. 26): (1) that of those who 
see it as false, pernicious and a threat to morality; (2) that of 
those who see it as a trivial truth hardly worth mentioning or 
arguing for; and (3) that of those who regard it as meaningless 
or empty, as raising no real issue. Grice’s analysis will prior-
itize the third rea ion. This rea ion is  ecially associated 
with Richard Hare, to whom statements about objectivity of 
moral values do not even have meaning. Grice presents the 
discussion between Mackie and Hare and says that both are 
wrong. To Grice, Mackie’s position is not totally clear. He os-
cillates between a positive and a negative version of objectiv-
ity: on the one hand, the positive version maintains that to 
assign objectivity to something is to say that it belongs to the 
basic “furniture” of the world; on the other hand, the negative 
version consists in assigning objectivity to something denying 
that statements about it are reducible or eliminable. 
To Grice, the two arguments used by Mackie to defend 
the anti-objectivist conception (or moral skepticism), namely, 
the argument from relativity and the argument from queer-
ness, are inconclusive. If the argument from queerness (which 
is the strongest of Mackie’s argument) is right, for instance, 
then it implies that many of our sciences are not possible. 
Arithmetic, for example, deals with numbers, but numbers 
are something very strange, in the same sense that moral val-
ues. We have no empirical access to numbers, but even so we 
can’t say that they don’t have some kind of reality. Although 
it is impossible to stumble on a number or touch it, in math-
ematics we actually use them to solve real problems, by per-
forming arithmetical operations. In this sense it is completely 
plausible to state that numbers have some objective existence, 
even if they are mere human constructions.
Thinking in this way, Grice, in the third of his Carus 
Lectures, argues in favor of a constructivist conception of 
values. Values, not only moral values, but all values, are part 
of the world that we live in, although they are human con-
structions. By the exercise of our rationality we are able to 
“create” the values that help us to guide our own lives. In order 
to pursue this constructivist programme, Grice needs three 
things (Cf. Grice, 1991, p. 70): (i) a set of metaphysical start-
ing points, i.e., things that are metaphysically primary; (ii) a 
set of recognized routines or procedures, by means of which 
non-primary items are built up on the basis of more primary 
items; and (iii) a theoretical motivation for proceeding from 
any given stage to a further stage, a justification or some pur-
pose for making that move.
In the third lecture, Grice shows a great interest in phi-
losophy of biology and, in particular, in the relations between 
biology and metaphysics. One of his fundamental discussions, 
in order to identify the metaphysical primary entities, is the 
distinction between accidental and essential properties of 
creatures. In contrast with accidental properties, “the essential 
properties of a thing are properties which that thing cannot 
lose without ceasing to exist (if you like, ceasing to be identical 
with itself )” (Grice, 1991, p. 79). In this sense, essential prop-
erties provide us a criterion of identification of those things7. 
Grice claims that the essential properties of this or that thing 
include, frequently, finality properties, properties which con-
sist in the possession of a certain detached finality (cf. Grice, 
1991, p. 80).
The distinction between accidental and essential prop-
erties is important to Grice in order to show that there are 
two different kinds of entities (metaphysical substance-types): 
human beings and persons. The contrast between these two 
creatures is based on the status of their properties, particu-
larly, rationality. In the substance-type ‘human being’, or ‘bi-
ological being’, rationality appears as an accidental property. 
Biological beings don’t need rationality in order to exist: they 
could continue to exist simply by using their instincts. This 
idea doesn’t mean, obviously, that no instances of biological 
beings possess rationality, but it means that in them this fea-
ture appears only accidentally. Differently, in substance-type 
persons, the attribute (or complex of attributes) called ‘ratio-
nality’ is an essential property (cf. Grice, 1991, p. 84). Thus, 
persons are defined in terms of rationality. This is an import-
ant change and Grice argues that there are two metaphysical 
routines underlying this idea (these routines render possible 
the Gricean constructivist project): Metaphysical Transub-
stantiation and the Humean Projection. 
The passage from biological beings to persons is called 
Metaphysical Transubstantiation (cf. Grice, 1991, p. 81-85; 
1986, p. 102). The central idea of this routine is that the two 
substances, human beings and persons, have the same prop-
7 In Logic, a property is essential to an individual if he had that property in all possible worlds. ‘Essence’, therefore, is a modal notion. 
Grice, in The Conception of Value, sustains the idea that there is a difference between ‘essential’ and ‘necessary’ properties. On one 
hand, essential properties provide criteria to identify particular objects, while, on the other hand, necessary properties are the proper-
ties that a given object should have.
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erties, but differently arranged. By the Metaphysical Tran-
substantiation, the properties of the biological type are re-
distributed (not invented), originating the new metaphysical 
substance. As a consequence, rationality becomes an essen-
tial chara eristic that enables the new metaphysical entity 
to look for ends. To overcome the complexity and the vari-
ation of the environment, biological beings start to use in a 
systematic way the property of rationality, rather than create 
new instincts. Rationality, therefore, is a good substitute to in-
stincts: through rationality it is easier to produce appropriate 
responses to the different stimuli and difficulties provided by 
the world around us. But mainly, “[this routine] permits us to 
say that there is a kind of creature whose essence, nature, or 
function is to evaluate. Grice hoped to show that the notion 
of value is indi ensable” (Baker, 1989, p. 506).
In Reply to Richards (1986, p. 102), Grice exemplifies the 
routine as follows:
Let us suppose that the genitor has sanc-
tioned the appearance of a biological type 
called humans, into which, considerate as 
always, he has built an attribute, or complex 
of attributes, called rationality, perhaps on 
the grounds that this would greatly assist 
its possessors in coping speedily and re-
sourcefully with survival problems posed by 
a wide range of environments, which they 
would thus be in a position to enter and to 
maintain themselves in. But, perhaps unwit-
tingly, he will thereby have created a breed 
of potential metaphysicians; and what they 
do (so to speak) to reconstitute themselves. 
They do not alter the totality of attributes 
which each of them as a human possess-
es, but they redistribute them; properties 
which they possess essentially as humans 
become properties which as substances of a 
new psychological type called persons they 
possess accidentally; and the property or 
properties called rationality, which attaches 
only accidentally to humans, attaches es-
sentially to persons.
As it is argued by Baker (1989), the first routine, conse-
quently, allows that this new metaphysical substance is able 
to valuate. The Metaphysical Transubstantiation routine 
operates primarily to turn human beings into persons and 
therefore valuers. The process, says Chapman (2005, p. 164), 
derives from the capacity, incidentally present in human be-
ings, for rationality. So, the attribution of rationality to a kind 
of metaphysical entity person allows them to think in terms 
of values and ends. In this sense, values and ends are only as-
sociated with persons.
But, anyway, how are values constructed by persons 
through rationality? The answer requires a second routine, 
the Humean Projection. 
According to Grice (1991, p. 88), this routine, basical-
ly, is an operation in which some attitudes are projected on 
onto the world. In other words, this routine consists in taking 
a  ecific mode of thinking and then transforming it into an 
attribute. This attribute is not ascribed to thinking, but to the 
thing which was thought. In this sense, thinking of a thing as 
good, by this operation, makes that the thinking becomes a 
property of that thing. The Humean Projection explains how 
our judgments of value ascribe a property to something in the 
world. Because we are rational, then we can, by the presence 
of certain qualifying conditions, attribute value to some item, 
we can project features on the world that in principle are con-
sidered only features of our states of mind.
Grice (1991, p. 88) exemplifies the Humean Projection 
in the following way:
To take an example with which I am present-
ly concerned, we might start with a notion 
of valuing, or of (hiphenatedly, so to speak) 
thinking-of-as-valuable some item x; and, 
subject to the presence of certain qualify-
ing conditions, we should end up with the 
simple thought, or belief, that the item x is 
valuable; and in thinking of it as valuable, 
we should now be thinking, correctly or in-
correctly, that the item x has the attribute of 
being valuable.
Basically, Grice’s idea in the Carus Lectures is to show 
that some values are objective and that there is a rational de-
mand for these absolute values. This demand can only be sat-
isfied by finding a being whose essence is able to apply forms 
of absolute value. We need absolute values, and, as Grice 
claims, only persons can provide it. Persons are obtained by 
the first routine, Metaphysical Transubstantiation, and next 
by the second routine, the Humean Projection, through 
which the rational being, the valuer, can attach objective val-
ues to things. Consequently, to construct values a rational be-
ing is necessary. Clearly, in The Conception of Value, rationality, 
as well as in A ects of Reason, is the basic concept. Without 
rationality it is impossible to perform these metaphysical op-
erations as well as the entire Gricean constructivist program.
Part III – Rationality and 
linguistic works
In this final section my purpose is to show that ra-
tionality is a central a ect also in Grice’s linguistic works. 
In contrast with A ects of Reason and The Conception of Value, 
in the previous texts Grice does not admit explicitly what is 
the role played by rationality. However, considering his work 
as a whole and considering some passages in the papers pub-
lished in life, it is possible to sustain that the linguistic pra ice 
is only possible because we are using, perhaps in a non-con-
scious way, our rationality. I will defend now that there are 
evidences, e ecially in Logic and Conversation (1975), Mean-
ing Revisited (1989c) and even in Meaning (1957), pointing to 
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the fact that Grice sustains that rationality is the basic feature 
that makes possible the transference and understanding of 
meanings. Further, in A ects of Reason, Grice clearly presents 
an analysis of the linguistic process that requires the rational-
ity operator.
Grice’s conception of meaning is first presented system-
atically in the famous paper Meaning (1957). In his semantic/
pragmatic analysis of language, the central concept is the con-
cept of ‘to mean’. Differently from classical semantics (found 
in Frege’s seminal paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung (1997), es-
pecially)8, Grice sustains a conception of meaning in which 
the  eaker’s intentions have a central role in the determina-
tion of the linguistic meaning. So, the meaning of a sentence 
is essentially connected with the intentions of the  eaker 
when he utters the sentence. In Grice’s view, when a  eak-
er means something with an utterance, he wants, firstly, to 
produce an effect in the hearer, and secondly, he wants that 
the hearer recognizes that the  eaker wants to produce that 
effect. In this sense, the meaning is not, like in the traditional 
conceptions of meaning, necessarily a feature of propositions. 
To determine precisely the meaning of an utterance, it is nec-
essary to consider, primarily, the relations between  eakers 
and hearers. But evidently not only that. Additionally, Grice 
sustains that for an appropriate understanding of the  eak-
er’s words the satisfa ion of a series of conditions is required: 
to know the  eaker’s identity, the time of the utterance, the 
context of the utterance, the meaning of the words at the mo-
ment when they were stated, the relations between the se-
quence of words, etc.
According to Chierchia (2003, p. 246), by the  eaker’s 
meaning we take what the  eaker wants to mean through a 
given expression in some circumstance of the  eech. Grice 
recognizes that it is necessary to distinguish between what the 
words literally or conventionally mean and what the  eakers 
want to signify by using the words in some contexts. So, in 
Meaning, Grice presents linguistic meaning as grounded in the 
 eaker’s meaning (a per ective which will be developed in 
various later writings, particularly a chapter of Logic and Con-
versation). Linguistic meaning is associated with the linguistic 
conventions that exist in some linguistic contexts or in a com-
munity of  eakers. Speaker’s meaning, in contrast, depends 
on the  eaker’s intentions to communicate some informa-
tion, i.e., it must be defined in psychological terms. An inter-
esting difference between them relates to the stability of the 
meaning: the linguistic meaning, even being consequence of 
conventions, is much more stable than the  eaker’s meaning. 
Given that the linguistic meaning is shared by a community, 
generally, for the success in communication, the meanings of 
the expression have to be re ected. On the other hand, the 
 eaker’s meaning can change quickly. A series of factors can 
change the  eaker’s linguistic behaviors and sometimes it is 
not easy to identify what are the  eaker’s intentions in the 
 eech. Anyway, in Meaning, Grice (1957, p. 385) affirms ex-
plicitly that “‘A [a  eaker] meant nonnaturally something by 
x [an utterance]’ is roughly equivalent to ‘A uttered x with the 
intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of 
this intention”.
In Meaning, Grice makes an important distinction be-
tween two kinds of meaning: between natural sense and non-
natural sense. This distinction is based on the role of the verb 
‘to mean’ in given sentences. For example, ‘Those spots mean 
(meant) measles’ is a case of natural sense. In turn, in the sen-
tence ‘Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the ‘bus 
is full’’ we can identify a case of nonnatural sense. In the sec-
ond case there is a conventional feature involved in the deter-
mination of meaning. The correct interpretation of the mes-
sage depends on understanding the intentions of the one who 
emits it. In this case it is not natural to think that the rings 
mean that the bus is full. To understand properly the mean-
ing of the sentence, and e ecially the meaning of the words 
between quotation marks, the hearer should have a belief that 
the signal intends to mean that9. 
However,  eakers, in general, use linguistic expressions 
in many different ways and sometimes their use does not 
follow the grammatical and even the current ways in which 
those linguistic expressions are normally used. It is very com-
mon that in the conversation a  eaker uses intentionally 
certain expressions or sentences that violate the conventional 
meaning. In cases like that, the meaning of the expression in 
the language and the meaning intended by the  eaker could 
not coincide. In order to perform an adequate transference of 
meaning and consequently achieve the mutual comprehen-
sion, a conversational background is demanded. In this sense, 
conversation to Grice is essentially a cooperative a ivity. 
8 In Über Sinn und Bedeutung, published in 1892, Frege presents the classical distinction between ‘sense’ and ‘reference’ (or ‘meaning’, 
as some translators prefer). According to Frege, proper names and sentences have a sense and a reference. In a rough way, the sense 
of an expression is its cognitive content and the reference an object (in the case of proper names, the object designed by the sign, in 
the case of sentences, a truth-value). Although widely criticized, this conception of meaning remained for a long time the main theory 
about the subject.
9 After the publication of Meaning, Grice’s conception of meaning received a number of criticisms. Probably the most important was 
from Searle in Speech Acts (1969) According to Searle, Grice’s analysis of meaning is problematic for two reasons: first, his conception 
is unable to explain adequately in what sense meaning can be related to rules or conventions. To Searle, this approach cannot show the 
connections between someone meaning something by his words and what that really means in the language. To illustrate the problem, 
Searle presents the classical example of the American soldier in WWII that utters a sentence in German to the enemy forces attempting 
to create in the enemies a belief that he is German. The problem is that the meaning of the sentence and the intended meaning are dif-
ferent. Second, Searle thinks that Grice, when he defines meaning in terms of the effects produced in the hearer, confuses illocutionary 
with perlocutionary acts. Grice defines meaning in terms of intending to perform a perlocutionary act, but uttering a sentence, to Searle, 
is a matter of intending to perform an illocutionary act, not a perlocutionary one. 
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Those who are participating in a conversation should follow 
some basic rules in order to reach mutual understanding. 
“Conversation was assumed to take place between two peo-
ple who alternate as  eaker and hearer, and to be concerned 
simply with the business of transferring information between 
them” (Chapman, 2005, p. 98). 
Grice, in his most famous paper Logic and Conversation 
(1975), develops further ideas about meaning and introduces 
the notions of conventional and conversational implicatures. 
By implicature we can understand, basically, what we want to 
say when we utter some expression or, in other words, what 
are intentions that we seek to communicate in the  eech. 
According to Grice, some implicatures are conventional, for 
example, when in some context certain terms acquire mean-
ing by convention, and some implicatures are conversation-
al. A conversational implicature is, usually, an a ect of the 
 eaker’s meaning that is not part of the conventional mean-
ing. This kind of implicature is the most interesting one to 
Grice, and, in Logic and Conversation, he aims to determine 
exactly in what it consists.  
In a conversation it is required that the  eakers fol-
low some basic directives for the transference of meaning to 
be successful. The basic principle governing conversation is 
called by Grice the cooperative principle. Such principle says: 
“Make your conversational contribution such as is required, 
at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or 
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” 
(1989b, p. 26). However, besides the cooperation principle, 
for a successful communication there are some maxims that 
should also be considered. These maxims are important be-
cause if they are not re ected, then the understanding of the 
meaning attached to the words of other people may be hin-
dered. Using Kantian terminology, Grice (1989b, p. 26-27) 
distinguishes four different kinds of maxims: (1) quantity, re-
lated to the quantity of information to be provided; (2) qual-
ity, associated to the veracity of the information; (3) relation, 
related to the relevance of the information; and (4) manner, 
related to how what is said is to be said. These four maxims, 
combined with the cooperation principle, the context, and 
the conventional meaning of the words, will lead to an appro-
priate transference of meanings.
But what is the relation between these conversational 
maxims and the cooperative principle with conversational 
implicatures? According to Grice (1989b, p. 28), the conver-
sational maxims and the conversational implicatures con-
nected with them are  ecially connected with the particular 
purposes that talk (and talk exchange) is designed to serve 
and is primarily employed to serve. A conversational impli-
cature occurs, for example, when one of the maxims that gov-
ern the  eech is violated. It occurs, for instance, when the 
meaning of the intended utterance is different from the usual 
meaning. Irony is a good example of violation of a conver-
sational maxim that originates a conversational implicature. 
Anyway, conversational implicatures should be ruled by ra-
tional principles. 
Now, I can introduce the discussion about rationality 
concerning linguistic pra ice. In some passages Grice explic-
itly sustains that rationality is fundamental in conversation. 
To him, conversation is basically a cooperative a ivity in 
which  eakers should follow certain rules that allows trans-
ference and apprehension of meanings. As I said before, the 
basic principle that rules this issue is the cooperative principle, 
which can be understood as a  ecies of rationality principle, as 
argued by Asa Kasher (1976). 
According to Kasher (1976), the cooperative prin-
ciple, in contrast with the maxims, does not make refer-
ence to the means used to reach the ends in conversation. 
In some cases of implicature, the cooperative principle does 
not give a satisfactory response, for example, about what 
is the advantage in some contexts of using a tautology or 
other non-implicated sentence. Because of such problems 
in Grice’s approach, Kasher replaces the cooperative prin-
ciple by a more general principle called Principle of Rational-
ization. The basic idea underlying this substitute principle 
is the optimization of the means to reach an end. Given a 
desired end, one is to choose that a ion which most effec-
tively, and at the least cost, attains that end. The rational-
ization principle says basically that there is no reason to as-
sume that the  eaker is not a rational agent; The  eaker’s 
statement, says Kasher, in the context of utterance, supplies 
the justification of his behavior. Every time that we engage 
in a conversation, we suppose that our interlocutor is a 
rational being and that the ends of the linguistic pra ice 
will be reached. So, after all, we have to assign rationality 
to the other  eaker. And not only that: to understand the 
intentions of the  eaker, it is necessary to suppose that he 
is following a habitual way of thinking and reasoning. It is 
totally impossible to think that we can achieve the ends in 
conversation without keeping in mind that rationality is 
operating, even in an unconscious way. 
The cooperative principle, given that it defines pat-
terns of linguistic behavior in certain contexts, rests on the 
idea that in all stages of communication it is always possible 
to identify the purpose or direction of the talk. This means 
that, together with conversational maxims, the cooperative 
principle has a teleological function: mutual understanding. 
If the cooperative principle sustains that the  eakers follow 
conversational rules in pursuit of communicative ends, then 
it is reasonable to think that there is some kind of rationality 
and mutual attribution of rationality working in the conver-
sation. To illustrate that, we can read in Logic and Conversa-
tion (1989b, p. 28):
As one of my avowed aims is to see talking 
as a special case or variety of purposive, 
indeed rational, behavior, it may be worth 
noting that the specific expectations or pre-
sumptions connected with at least some of 
the foregoing maxims have their analogies 
in the sphere of transactions that are not 
talk exchanges.
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And some lines later (1989b, p. 29):
I am, however, enough of a rationalist to 
want to find a basis that underlies these 
facts, undeniable though they may be; I 
would like to be able to think of the stan-
dard type of conversational practice not 
merely as something that all or most do 
in fact follow but as something that it is 
reasonable for us to follow, that we should 
not abandon.
The re ect for conversational maxims and the co-
operative principle is considered as something reasonable, 
or rational, in the sense that it is expected that if someone 
is concerned with the central objectives of communica-
tion, then it is also expected that he is intere ed in partic-
ipating in conversations that are fruitful in some way. We 
can understand other people because we have a common 
background and we re ect a minimal degree of rational-
ity. Grice’s conception of meaning, in my view, in order 
to be correctly understood, has to be analyzed in terms of 
central ideas found in Meaning and Logic and Conversation. 
As Chapman (2005, p. 102) rightly affirms, there are in Grice 
three different levels of meaning at which a  eaker may be 
committed to a proposition: (i) what is said, (ii) convention-
al meaning (including conventional implicatures), and (iii) 
what is conversationally implicated. The most attra ive 
level, obviously, is the level of conversational implicatures. 
However, his conception of meaning, even when a conver-
sational implicature is used, depends on the intention of the 
 eaker. So, the linguistic pra ice is dependent on reason. 
It is not possible to understand the intentions of the  eaker 
if the hearer is not able to identify linguistic patterns and 
contextual elements. The hearer is able to realize this be-
cause he is a rational agent. He shares with the  eaker the 
same rules that govern communication. If our interlocutor 
acts in an irrational way, then communication is impossible. 
In Meaning Revisited, Grice returns to these important 
discussions about the nature of meaning. Attempting to 
identify the main features of the concept of meaning and the 
relations among language, thought and reality, Grice affirms 
that in discussions about meaning questions of value might 
arise. In this paper, Grice tries to expound the relations be-
tween meaning, rationality and value, something very simi-
lar to what he makes in the posthumous books. Grice affirms 
(1989b, p. 298) that he has “strong suspicious that the most 
fruitful idea [in the attempt to identify the relations between 
these concepts] is the idea that a rational creature is a creature 
which evaluates”. According to Grice, there are some prob-
lems connected with meaning in which questions of value 
might arise. I don’t want to explain these problems here, but 
in Meaning Revisited it becomes clear that meaning is connect-
ed with rationality and value. 
Anyway, if in his linguistic papers Grice only suggests 
that rationality is attached to questions of meaning and lan-
guage, in A ects of Reason he categorically shows the relations 
between meaning and rationality. As I showed in the first 
section, Grice, in his formal analysis of pra ical and alethic 
sentences, introduces some modals and mood operators, at-
tempting to elucidate the structure of these sentences. None-
theless, in all formalizations, the rationality operator is the 
basic one. In order to exhibit the logical features of sentences, 
at a first moment, Grice analyses simple logical sentences. But 
the analysis of utterances is not restricted only to the logical 
field. Because of this, afterwards, he introduces new opera-
tors to explain the logical features of indicative, imperative 
and interrogative sentences in natural language. For that, he 
needs to consider the relations between  eakers and hearers. 
So, the new operators introduced are essentially associated 
with his views on meaning, e ecially regarding the process 
of transference and understanding of the meaning of utter-
ances. To illustrate this, we can take as an example the case 
of indicative sentences: given that Peter and John are talking 
and Peter says to John “The snow is white”. In Grice’s analysis 
(2001, p. 52) this utterance could be formalized as: ‘U (the 
 eaker, Peter) to utter to H (John) a sentence of the form 
Op1 + p, if U wills H judges U judges p’. In this case, and in 
the other variants, the utterance falls within the scope of the 
rationality operator, Acc. 
To Grice (2001, p. 69), the intended effect of the utter-
ance on a hearer is one or another of a set of psychological 
attitudes with re ect to some propositional content. Each 
one of the operators corresponds to an element that belongs 
to this set. Grice uses these operators in accordance with his 
views about meaning. According to these views, what a  eak-
er means is explained in terms of the effect that he intends to 
produce in the hearer; what a sentence means is explained in 
terms of the directives related to the use of the sentence in 
a primitive (basic) way aiming to induce in the hearer some 
effect. In fact, we see clearly the intrinsic relations maintained 
between the Gricean semantic/pragmatic conceptions and 
the logical/formal conceptions. I sustain that it is sufficient to 
show that rationality does not have a secondary importance 
in the conceptions of meaning and conversation, but a prima-
ry importance instead.
Conclusion 
The discussion about the conception of rationality in 
Grice deserves more attention by commentators and ob-
viously a more adequate and exhaustive analysis. Anyway, I 
believe that in this paper I was able to show that this concept 
occupies a central role in Grice’s philosophy and is complete-
ly different from any other concept. Although concepts like 
‘meaning’ and ‘implicature’ are more famous, ‘rationality’ is at 
the core of his philosophy and makes possible the plausibility 
of the other concepts. Section I explained that, in A ects of 
Reason, rationality is connected with the notions of ‘reasoning’ 
and ‘reasons’ and is defined in terms of inference and preser-
vation of value. Section II showed the Gricean constructivist 
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program in metaphysics and the role played by rationality in 
the construction of objective values. Finally, Section III tried 
to show that rationality operates also in the linguistic field 
and is the element which ultimately renders possible the lin-
guistic pra ice.
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